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I. INTRODUCTION
The Supreme Court of Canada’s 2019 decisions Orphan Wells1 and Desgagnés2
both have important implications for the application and practice of bankruptcy law
and maritime law, respectively. In both cases, the Court found no conﬂict between
the federal and provincial legislation at issue. Both decisions have provoked
signiﬁcant academic- and practitioner-led critiques, and have illustrated key themes
within the division of power analysis in the private law context.
This short article will begin by providing a summary of each case, an overview
of the commentary following the decision and a discussion of the subsequent
judicial application of the decision. Following this, the key themes that the decisions
highlighted, both individually and jointly, will be examined. This discussion will
include an assessment of how conﬂicts between federal and provincial schemes are
managed in a private law context, the impact of choice of law clauses, as well as the
implications of the public interest and its inﬂuence on the priority of creditors. The
article will conclude with a comment on federalism in a private law context and will
identify the practices in secured lending impacted by these decisions that are worth
monitoring going forward, especially in the context of recent Supreme Court of
Canada case law on third party litigation funding.
II. THE ORPHAN WELLS DECISION
1.

Overview

The majority held that there was no conﬂict between the Bankruptcy and
Insolvency Act3 and the provincial environmental remediation regime by narrowing
the “creditor” prong of the Abitibi4 test. The dissent concluded that there was an
1

Orphan Well Assn. v. Grant Thornton Ltd., [2019] S.C.J. No. 5, 2019 SCC 5 (S.C.C.)
[hereinafter “Orphan Wells”].
2

Desgagnés Transport Inc. v. Wärtsilä Canada Inc., [2019] S.C.J. No. 58, 2019 SCC 58
(S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Desgagnés”].
3

R.S.C. 1985, c. B-3 [hereinafter “BIA”].

4

Newfoundland and Labrador v. AbitibiBowater Inc., [2012] S.C.J. No. 67, 2012 SCC 67,
at para. 26 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Abitibi”]. The three-prong test in Abitibi determines when
environmental obligations imposed by a regulator are considered a provable claim for the
purpose of the BIA. It requires that ﬁrst there must be a debt or liability to a creditor. Second,
that this debt or liability is incurred prior to the debtor becoming bankrupt. Third, that it is
possible to attach a monetary value to the debt or liability.
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operational conﬂict which would engage the paramountcy doctrine, and that the
Abitibi test should not be modiﬁed. Justice Moldaver, who signed on to the majority
in Abitibi, co-wrote the dissenting opinion in this case.
2.

Factual History and Legal Issues

Redwater Energy Corporation (“Redwater”) was an oil and gas company that
owned dozens of oil wells throughout Alberta. Most of these wells were no longer
operating and required expensive environmental clean-up.5 Redwater encountered
ﬁnancial difficulties. Redwater’s receiver, Grant Thornton Limited (“Grant Thornton”),
was told by the Alberta Energy Regulator (“Regulator”) that it would need to meet
Redwater’s end-of-life obligations6 for the defunct wells. Until this work was done,
the Regulator would not transfer any of the licences for Redwater’s proﬁtable
assets.7 Grant Thornton disclaimed the unproﬁtable wells, believing that it would
eliminate the resulting environmental liabilities.8 Grant Thornton argued that in the
conﬂict between secured creditors and the Regulator’s environmental requirements,
the paramountcy doctrine should preserve the rights of secured creditors. This
position was contested by the provincial regulators intervening in the case.
3. Majority Analysis (Wagner C.J.C., Abella, Karakatsanis, Gascon and
Brown JJ.)
Grant Thornton highlighted two conﬂicts between the provincial regime and the
BIA that ought to engage paramountcy. First, trustees are included as licensees in the
provincial legislation. Trustees can be released from environmental liability under
the BIA,9 but licensees are required to satisfy statutory end-of-life obligations. Grant
Thornton’s concern stemmed from the possibility that it would be held personally
liable to remediate the wells as a licensee, something that is precluded by the BIA.10
Second, Grant Thornton asserted that the Regulator’s use of its statutory powers
to discharge environmental liabilities have the same priority of unsecured claims.
These claims cannot be satisﬁed prior to secured claims by creditors under the BIA;
i.e., the Regulator does not have super priority.11 In response, the Regulator
suggested that a proper application of the Abitibi test demonstrates that “environ5

Orphan Wells, at para. 48.

6

Statutory end-of-life obligations are duties prescribed to licensees that require the
plugging of oil wells to prevent leaks, the dismantling of surface structures and restoration of
the surface to its previous conditions. Licensees must accept these conditions in order to
obtain licences. Orphan Wells, at para. 16.
7

Orphan Wells, at para. 19.

8

Orphan Wells, at paras. 51-52.

9

Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. B-3, s. 14.06(1.2).

10

Orphan Wells, at para. 69.

11

Orphan Wells, at para. 70.
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mental obligations are not provable claims in bankruptcy”12 and therefore it would
not be a creditor.
The Court concluded that there was no operational conﬂict or frustration of the
BIA’s purpose. The priority scheme was unaffected as the Regulator’s claims were
not provable under the Abitibi test.
(a)

Conﬂict between the BIA and the Provincial Scheme

The Court held that there was no conﬂict or frustration of purpose between the
BIA and the provincial scheme.13 Section 14.06 of the BIA refers to the personal
liability of a trustee, as evidenced by consistent references made in both official
languages.14 The trustee is protected from personal liability for environmental
damages that arise prior to their appointment. However, the bankrupt estate remains
responsible for any outstanding environmental liabilities.15 Grant Thornton could
not prove a conﬂict because the Regulator had not held them personally liable.16 The
provincial scheme had been in place for 20 years, and no trustee, including Grant
Thornton, had been held personally liable by the Regulator for clean-up costs.17 The
Court disagreed that this hypothetical conﬂict justiﬁed its intervention given the
restraint the paramountcy doctrine requires.18
(b)

Provable Claims and Abitibi

In Abitibi, the Court established a three-part test to determine when environmental obligations imposed by a regulator are considered a provable claim for the BIA:
“First, there must be a debt, a liability or an obligation to a creditor. Second, the
debt, liability or obligation must be incurred before the debtor becomes bankrupt.
Third, it must be possible to attach a monetary value to the debt, liability or
obligation.”19
The Court held that the second branch of the Abitibi test was satisﬁed here, as
there was no doubt as to whether the environmental liabilities were incurred before
Redwater went bankrupt. An analysis of the ﬁrst and third branches of the test was
then undertaken.20
In determining whether a debt or liability to a creditor existed, the majority
12

Orphan Wells, at para. 70.

13

Orphan Wells, at para. 77.

14

Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. B-3, s. 14.06(1.2).

15

Orphan Wells, at paras. 88, 93, 98, 99.

16

Orphan Wells, at para. 103.

17

Orphan Wells, at paras. 111-113.

18

Orphan Wells, at para. 105.

19

Newfoundland and Labrador v. AbitibiBowater Inc., [2012] S.C.J. No. 67, 2012 SCC
67, at para. 26 (S.C.C.) [emphasis in original].
20

Orphan Wells, at para. 120.
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narrowed the deﬁnition of “creditor” in the ﬁrst prong of the test. The Court clariﬁed
that Abitibi should not stand for the proposition that a regulator is always a creditor
when enforcing statutory obligations upon a debtor.21 The regulator acted in the
public interest through issuing its orders and enforcing requirements. The Court
found that the public was the beneﬁciary of these actions and that the province did
not stand to gain ﬁnancially from the orders.22 As a result, the Court concluded that
the ﬁrst prong of the Abitibi test was not met and that the Regulator was not a
creditor. Despite the Regulator conceding that it was a creditor at a lower court, the
Supreme Court was willing to disregard the Regulator’s concession citing that
“concessions of law are not binding on this Court”.23
The “monetary value” step outlined in the third prong of the Abitibi test is
generally referred to as the “sufficient certainty” test. The Court clariﬁed that as the
Regulator was not a creditor, it need not perform this part of the analysis, but
proceeded to demonstrate how its analysis differed from the lower courts.24 The
Regulator suggested that the courts below erred and went beyond the test to
determine whether the Regulator’s obligations were intrinsically ﬁnancial.25 Rather,
the focus of the analysis ought to have been on whether the Regulator would
“perform the environmental work and assert a monetary claim for the reimbursement”.26 The Court found that the Regulator was not in the business of remediating
abandoned wells, but rather that this was the obligation of the licensee.27
The Orphaned Wells Association (“OWA”) is a non-proﬁt organization with its
own mandate and board that operates as an independent entity at arm’s-length with
the province.28 This organization performs environmental remediation for orphaned
wells with a large backlog of projects. The OWA relies on its own risk assessment
tools to determine when and how it will perform environmental work on orphaned
wells. Further, given the decade-long backlog — which continues to worsen — in
performing environmental work on orphaned wells, it is unlikely that a ﬁnancial
claim would materialize before the estate was ﬁnalized and discharged.29 Thus, the
sufficient certainty test would not be met. The Court concluded that the Regulator
and the OWA are not ²inextricably intertwined² as the dissent suggests, and that
even if they were, the sufficient certainty test cannot be satisﬁed.
21

Orphan Wells, at para. 122.

22

Orphan Wells, at para. 122.

23

Orphan Wells, at para. 125.

24

Orphan Wells, at para. 139.

25

Orphan Wells, at para. 121.

26

Orphan Wells, at para. 121.

27

Orphan Wells, at para. 145.

28

Orphan Wells, at para. 148.

29

Orphan Wells, at para. 153.
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The conclusion of the Abitibi test revealed that the end-of-life obligations binding
on Grant Thornton are not provable in the bankruptcy and therefore do not conﬂict
with the priority scheme outlined in the BIA.30 The Court went further to state that
“[b]ankruptcy is not a licence to ignore rules”31 and that insolvency professionals
must comply with provincial laws during bankruptcy, such as fulﬁlling nonmonetary obligations binding on a bankrupt estate. Consequently, the Court allowed
the appeal and concluded that there was no conﬂict between Alberta’s regulatory
regime and the BIA, and so no provisions of the regulatory regime would be
rendered inoperative.32
4.

Dissenting Analysis (Côté and Deschamps JJ.)

The dissent disagreed with the majority’s analysis and found that there was a
conﬂict between the statutes. It also held that the Regulator had a provable claim
because it was a creditor and the required remediation work for the orphaned wells
would likely be performed by either itself or the OWA.
(a)

Operational Conﬂict

The dissent held that there was an operational conﬂict stemming from an
interpretation of section 14.06(4) that differed from the majority’s analysis. It argued
that the majority’s interpretation of section 14.06 as a whole relied on a literal or
“plain-meaning” interpretation that would be inconsistent with the modern principles of statutory interpretation.33 Relying on Hansard evidence, it found that the
drafters intentionally did not require the trustee to use the estate’s assets to comply
with environmental remediation orders.34 A broader analysis of the provisions
around section 14.06(4) also supports the trustee’s right to disclaim property in the
face of environmental orders.35 In short, it concluded that Grant Thornton validly
disclaimed the unproﬁtable wells, and that the subsequent remediation orders
presented a conﬂict. Further, the dissent held that the order conditions on
transferring the licences effectively did impose personal liability on Grant Thornton.
The value of the estate could not meet the cost of the remediation, and additional
funds could not be obtained without selling the estate’s proﬁtable assets, which the
Regulator prevented until the remediation had taken place.36
(b)

Provable Claims and Abitibi

Unlike the majority, the dissent arrived at a different conclusion for the ﬁrst prong
30

Orphan Wells, at para. 159.

31

Orphan Wells, at para. 160.

32

Orphan Wells, at para. 162.

33

Orphan Wells, at paras. 218-221.

34

Orphan Wells, at paras. 202-206.

35

Orphan Wells, at paras. 207-213.

36

Orphan Wells, at paras. 227-230.
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of the Abitibi test and reasoned that the Regulator was in fact a creditor. The dissent
reasoned as follows:
Redwater owes a debt to [the Regulator], ... and [the Regulator] has attempted to
enforce that debt by issuing the Abandonment Orders, which require Redwater to
make good on its obligation. If Redwater (or [Grant Thornton], as the receiver and
trustee) does not abide by those orders — to the detriment of the estate’s other
creditors — it can be held liable under provincial law. This is, by any deﬁnition, an
exercise of enforcement power, which is precisely what Abitibi describes. In fact,
[the Regulator] itself conceded this point twice — ﬁrst before the Court of Queen’s
Bench, and again at the Court of Appeal (chambers judge reasons, at para. 164;
C.A. reasons, at para. 73).37

The dissent rejected the argument that a regulator can only be considered a
creditor when acting in the public interest.38 Instead, it found that the broad
deﬁnition of a creditor, as advanced in Abitibi, was appropriate and the Court should
let the provable claim standard stand. Under the reformulated test, the dissent goes
further to say that it is impossible to ﬁnd a regulator to be a creditor if it is acting
in the public interest beyond the very narrow facts of Abitibi.39 The dissent
concludes that this ﬁrst prong is in fact met, and that the Court is too easily
overturning its recent precedents with its decision.40
To the third prong, the dissent held that it was sufficiently certain that the
remediation work would be performed by either the Regulator or the OWA.41 The
non-proﬁt status of the OWA was not persuasive enough to convince the dissent that
the OWA was intended to serve another, unrelated purpose to the Regulator. Pointing
to the Regulator’s ability to appoint members to the OWA’s board and the OWA’s
lack of independence and susceptibility to inﬂuence from the Regulator as indicators
to suggest with sufficient certainty that the Regulator or the OWA would complete
the remediation work.
Ultimately, the dissent concluded that proceeding with the remediation orders
effectively wipes out the estate’s remaining value and leaves its creditors (save the
Regulator) without any form of recovery.42 The dissent reminded the Court that in
the exercise of statutory interpretation, its goal is to interpret law and not policy.43
III. RESPONSE
1.

TO THE

ORPHAN WELLS DECISION

Commentary
37

Orphan Wells, at para. 238 [emphasis in original].

38

Orphan Wells, at para. 239.

39

Orphan Wells, at para. 248.

40

Orphan Wells, at para. 252.

41

Orphan Wells, at para. 255.

42

Orphan Wells, at para. 289.

43

Orphan Wells, at para. 290.
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(a)

Effects on Secured Lending

The most consistent and “loudest” response from the commentary that followed
Orphan Wells was that the decision would be detrimental for secured lenders. One
such analysis described the decision as “a blow to secured lenders and creditors”.44
In circumstances where a company’s end-of-life obligations exceed the liquidation
value of the estate, there would be little incentive for a secured creditor to seek
recovery at all as it would merely lead to further economic losses arising from
pursuing its outstanding balances.45 Traditional lending practices to oil and gas
companies may potentially be upended due to this decision. Kashuba, Fougere and
Makowsky suggest this decision increases the difficulty for oil and gas companies
to survive because lenders would require larger ﬁnancial reserves for environmental
remediation.46 Lenders may also take a more active role in overseeing their debtor
companies and scrutinizing processes and decisions in hopes of preserving recovery
of their capital.
However, initial comments from the Canadian Association of Petroleum Producers and the Explorers and Producers of Canada indicate that they do not anticipate
that the decision will cause challenges.47 Instead, both small and large energy
producers maintain that this decision restores the balance between obligations to the
environment and creditor interests. It is also possible that the decision could help
foster a secondary market for environmental ﬁnancing, which currently does not
exist in Canada.48
(b)

Polluter Pay, or Third Party Pay?

This decision prompts a transition from a “polluter pay” principle to a “third party
44

Saad Gaya, “Orphan Well Association v. Grant Thornton Ltd: Constitutional Doctrines
Applied to Cleaning up Old Oil Wells” The Court.ca (April 5, 2019), online: <www.thecourt.
ca/orphan-well-association-v-gtl-constitutional-doctrines-applied-to-cleaning-up-old-oilwells/>.

45
Sean F. Collins, Walker W. MacLeod & Kimberly J. Howard, “Redwater – SCC
Delivers the Final Word” McCarthy Tétrault (February 4, 2019), online: <www.mccarthy.
ca/en/insights/blogs/restructuring-roundup/redwater-scc-delivers-ﬁnal-word>.

46
Kyle Kashuba, Kevin A. Fougere & Tanis Makowsky, “SCC Says Orphan Wells
Cannot be Ignored” Torys (February 4, 2019), online: <www.torys.com/insights/publications/
2019/02/scc-says-orphan-wells-cannot-be-ignored>.

47
Tracy Johnson, “Supreme Court Rules Energy Companies Must Clean up Old Wells –
Even in Bankruptcy” CBC News (January 31, 2019), online: <www.cbc.ca/news/business/
supreme-court-redwater-decision-orphan-wells-1.4998995>.

48
Dale Smith, “SCC Decision Will Impact Provincial Regulators” Law Times (May 29,
2019), online: <www.lawtimesnews.com/practice-areas/litigation/scc-decision-will-impactprovincial-regulators/263544>.
 See also Orphan Wells, at para. 290 (the Canadian Bankers’
Association noted that upfront bonding for environmental obligations was becoming common
in the United States).
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pay” system.49 The dissent goes further to note that this becomes a “lender-pays
regime”.50 Such a transition references the opportunities for underfunded energy
companies with large outstanding environmental liabilities to shirk these obligations
upon bankruptcy. The cost of these environmental liabilities are ultimately borne by
the company’s creditors. However, Professor Girgis rejects this assertion.51 She
instead suggests that this decision serves to remind creditors that there are now
additional factors to consider prior to making the decision to lend.52 However, this
calculation can only be made if the priorities in bankruptcy are clear and static.53
Ultimately, the shift to a third party pay system is a nod to a super priority status
attributed to regulators in matters of environmental contamination and resulting
liabilities. Markets favour stability and predictability, and this decision signiﬁes
additional concerns that lenders must consider before extending funds.
(c) Potentially Negative Consequences for Licensed Insolvency Trustees in
Bankruptcy
Other commentators also speculated that the decision would act as a disincentive
for insolvency professionals from taking on cases with substantial environmental
liabilities.54 Based on this ruling, there is also the possibility for increased
administrative expenses to ensure that obligations and outstanding environmental
liabilities are addressed prior to the estate’s assets being distributed.55 The decision
has demonstrated that the Regulator was able to obtain funds to cover the
remediation of the orphan wells, effectively receiving the value of the assets and
49

Orphan Wells, at para. 291.

50

Orphan Wells, at para. 291.

51

Jassmine Girgis, “Lessons from Redwater: Discard the AbitibiBowater Test and
Legislate Super Priority for the Regulator” ABlawg (March 1, 2019), online: <www.ablawg.
ca/2019/03/01/lessons-from-redwater-discard-the-abitibibowater-test-and-legislate-superpriority-for-the-regulator/>.

52

Jassmine Girgis, “Lessons from Redwater: Discard the AbitibiBowater Test and
Legislate Super Priority for the Regulator” ABlawg (March 1, 2019), online: <www.ablawg.
ca/2019/03/01/lessons-from-redwater-discard-the-abitibibowater-test-and-legislate-superpriority-for-the-regulator/>.

53

Jassmine Girgis, “Lessons from Redwater: Discard the AbitibiBowater Test and
Legislate Super Priority for the Regulator” ABlawg (March 1, 2019), online: <www.ablawg.
ca/2019/03/01/lessons-from-redwater-discard-the-abitibibowater-test-and-legislate-superpriority-for-the-regulator/>.

54
Saad Gaya, “Orphan Well Association v. Grant Thornton Ltd: Constitutional Doctrines
Applied to Cleaning up Old Oil Wells” The Court.ca (April 5, 2019), online: <www.thecourt.
ca/orphan-well-association-v-gtl-constitutional-doctrines-applied-to-cleaning-up-old-oilwells/>.

55
Kyle Kashuba, Kevin A. Fougere & Tanis Makowsky, “SCC Says Orphan Wells
Cannot be Ignored” Torys (February 4, 2019), online: <www.torys.com/insights/publications/

2019/02/scc-says-orphan-wells-cannot-be-ignored>.
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leaving none to creditors. With this trend, it has also been suggested that trustees and
lawyers may be more aggressive in obtaining indemnities for their fees before
agreeing to represent these clients. This would ensure that they need not litigate to
get paid in situations where the value of remediation exceeds the value of the
estate.56
(d)

Uncertainty Continues for the Abitibi Test

Richard Butler argues that far from clarifying the Abitibi test, the decision in
Orphan Wells only continues the uncertainty.57 He posits that sufficient certainty of
government action could be achieved in two ways: the government actually
undertakes or plans to do the work, or through implication as the remediator of last
resort.58 The dissent found sufficient certainty that the wells would be remediated by
the government, either by the Regulator or the OWA. Butler argues that this ﬁnding
undercuts the point of Abitibi, negates the need for the three-part test and runs
contrary to the principles of cooperative federalism.59 “No realistic alternatives
mean that any regulator orders, with monetary consequences, themselves become a
sufficient basis for a Crown claim provable and constitutional conﬂict. The sufficient
certainty step may as well have been skipped altogether”.60 This interpretation
belies the suggestion that the provincial government set up and funded a mechanism,
i.e., the OWA, speciﬁcally to remediate the orphan wells.
(e)

Effect on the Number of Orphan Wells

It is also possible that the decision could ironically result in more orphan wells
despite its policy intentions. This concern was highlighted by Côté J. in her
dissenting reasons.61 If insolvent companies cannot pass on their remediation
obligations through the insolvency process, the wells will remain orphans and
become the responsibility of the OWA.62 This could apply even to valuable,
still-operational wells, since their licence cannot be transferred without the
company’s other wells being remediated. The result will be semi-operational wells
56

See Erin D. Farrell, Jessica E.M. Boily & Haddon Murray, “Third Time’s a Charm for
Alberta Regulator: How the SCC Decision in Redwater Could Change the Role of
Environmental Orders in Ontario Insolvency Proceedings” Gowling WLG (March 5, 2019),
online: <gowlingwlg.com/en/insights-resources/articles/2019/redwater-could-changeenvironmental-orders-ontario/>.

57

Richard Butler, “Understanding Redwater” (2019) 34:3 B.F.L.R. 461.

58

Richard Butler, “Understanding Redwater” (2019) 34:3 B.F.L.R. 461, at 471.

59

Richard Butler, “Understanding Redwater” (2019) 34:3 B.F.L.R. 461, at 472.
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becoming orphaned as a function of the company being unable to obtain licences
due to outstanding orphans.
(f)

The Decision Could Increase Regulatory Enforcement

Some observers have suggested that enforcement may become more aggressive,
since the decision makes it easier to enforce environmental remediation orders.63 As
one law ﬁrm put it, “regulators may intervene earlier while there is still a business
to save”.64 Further, it is also less likely that governments will pursue the directors
and officers of insolvent corporations with environmental liabilities as trustees step
into the role of fulﬁlling outstanding environmental obligations.65 There has also
been discussion about whether the decision will have a broader application than just
for orphaned wells, while others claim that this sort of issue is unique to Alberta.66
Additionally, an argument can be made that the clariﬁcation of the Abitibi test makes
it easier for provincial environment ministries to enforce the “polluter pay” principle
beyond bankruptcy given the new level of attention provided by officers and
directors.67 However, the unique statutory matrix surrounding orphan wells may
limit the decision’s application in other commercial circumstances, let alone under
other provincial regimes.68
(g)

Subsequent Judicial Treatment

Since the Orphan Wells decision was released at the beginning of 2019, it has
been cited by the courts 33 times (as of February 22, 2020). Fourteen of these cases
arose from a single proceeding at the Trademarks Opposition Board. The majority
of other cases referenced Orphan Wells in relation to paramountcy, though others
63
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have cited it to assist in applying the Abitibi test,69 for statutory interpretation
principles and to assess if concessions of law are binding.
The most fulsome discussion of Orphan Wells was in a case adjudicating the
bankruptcy of Sequoia Resources.70 In that case, the Alberta Court of Queen’s
Bench held that an abandonment and remediation order was not a liability for the
purposes of an oppression claim.71 The result of this ﬁnding was to nullify the claim
entirely. The Court of Appeal later upheld this analysis.72
IV. THE DESGAGNÉS DECISION
1.

Overview

The majority in Desgagnés held that there was no conﬂict between the Civil Code
of Québec73 and maritime law because Parliament had not included express
language to oust provincial laws governing contracts. It further held that there was
no need to read down the Civil Code since the contract for ship engine parts did not
engage the core of the federal head of power over shipping and navigation. The
concurring analysis differed by characterizing the dispute as fundamentally about
property and civil rights, eliminating the need for further constitutional analysis.
2.

Factual History and Legal Issues

Wärtsilä was in the business of supplying engine parts for ships. Wärtsilä supplied
engine parts for ships to Desgagnés through its Quebec office and negotiated a
contract which included a six-month warranty and a clause that limited Wärtsilä’s
liability to 250,000. The contract speciﬁed that the governing law would be that of
the location of Wärtsila’s office. After the six-month warranty period, a major ship
failure occurred in one of Desgagnés’ ships ﬁtted with Wärtsilä’s crank shaft. The
trial judge concluded that it was Wärtsilä’s crankshaft that caused the issue and
damage to the ship. She concluded that the dispute was governed by the Civil Code.
While the dispute related to maritime activities, it was not “integrally connected”.
The trial judge found that Wärtsilä was responsible for the quantum of the damages,
amounting to over $5.6 million. Upon appeal, the majority of the Quebec Court of
Appeal found that maritime law governed the dispute, and therefore Wärtsilä was
69
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able to rely on the limitation of liability clause, with a maximum liability of 250,000.
The main question on appeal to the Supreme Court of Canada was whether the
contractual claim was governed by the federal authority over navigation and
shipping or the provincial authority over property and civil rights.
3. Majority Analysis (Moldaver, Karakatsanis, Gascon, Côté, Rowe and
Martin JJ.)
The majority viewed maritime law as non-statutory law with principles derived
from precedent and custom while simultaneously allowing it to be judicially
developed unless “supplanted by validly enacted federal legislation”.74 In the
characterization analysis, the majority examined the pith and substance of the
matter. As this analysis had not been conducted for a non-statutory area of law, i.e.,
maritime law, a slightly different pith and substance analysis was required which
focused on the substantive law at issue. The majority characterized the matter as
“the sale of marine engine parts intended for use on a commercial vessel”.75 They
reasoned that the sale of marine engine parts intended for use on a commercial
vessel is truly sufficiently connected to navigation and shipping,76 but also agreed
that the Civil Code, speciﬁcally pertaining to warranties in contracts of sales, is a
valid provincial law in pith and substance that concerns property and civil rights
pursuant to section 92(13).77
The majority held that the integral connection test for the trade and commerce
power should be applied more strictly than for the shipping and navigation power,
since there is more risk of federal overreach in trade and commerce issues.78 Unlike
the concurring opinion, the majority upheld the status quo of different standards for
different powers.79 The majority then concluded that the supply of marine engine
parts is integrally connected to navigation and shipping.80 However, it differed from
the Court of Appeal, who ended their analysis after also coming to this conclusion.
After conducting a division of powers analysis, the majority held that there was
a double aspect to the sale of marine engine parts, but that neither interjurisdictional
immunity nor paramountcy applied to these facts.81 Interjurisdictional immunity did
not apply to this situation because there was no precedent for contractual issues
74
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engaging the core of federal competence over navigation and shipping.82 This is in
contrast to the discrete and specialized laws applicable to marine negligence, which
are required in order to ensure that a consistent body of rules operates at sea.83
Paramountcy also did not apply because of the non-statutory nature of maritime law.
The Court could not accept that those largely common law rules could prevail over
valid provincial legislation.84 Finally, absent “very clear language” to occupy the
ﬁeld exclusively, federal laws will not oust valid provincial ones.85 Therefore, there
was no genuine conﬂict between the Civil Code and maritime law, and paramountcy
could not apply.86
4.

Concurring Analysis (Wagner C.J.C., Abella and Brown JJ.)

The concurring opinion agreed with the majority that the Civil Code properly
governed the dispute. However, it differed from the majority on the importance of
statutory limits over Parliament’s authority over navigation and shipping.87 The
concurring judges asserted that the important part of the pith and substance analysis
is not if Parliament deﬁned the scope of its legislative authority, but rather if the
matter ﬁts into one of its heads of power.88 Concluding that the dispute was pith and
substance about property and civil rights, it did not conduct an analysis about
interjurisdictional immunity or paramountcy.89
The concurring opinion also differed from the majority as to whether there should
be different tests for different heads of power. The concurrence argued that this
would be “a recipe for confusion and inconsistency”.90 Despite this divergence, it
arrived at the same conclusion as the majority that the shipping and navigation
power does not encompass all maritime matters.91 Interestingly, the concurrence
stressed that the decision should not be seen as a comment on whether Parliament
would be able to legislate contracts of trade by sea where the dominant matter is not
the sale of goods.92
V. RESPONSE
1.

TO THE

DESGAGNÉS DECISION

Commentary
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A major concern with the Desgagnés decision is that it chips away at the
uniformity of what had previously been considered within the scope of maritime
law. This case was not the ﬁrst to do so. In earlier cases, the Supreme Court
indicated that valid provincial laws will be allowed to have incidental effects on the
federal head of power, including in maritime law, unless interjurisdictional
immunity or paramountcy applied.93 The question then becomes which activities are
governed by maritime laws, and which are governed by provincial ones. One
commentator highlighted the inconsistency of regulating marine engine parts
through maritime law, but the terms and conditions of that sale through provincial
law.94
An important implication of greater provincial authority is that it may lead to
different results depending on where the contract was signed, or if the action was
started in a provincial or federal court.95 This conclusion is a departure from
previous case law concerning maritime law, which emphasized that decisions should
be consistent throughout Canada.96 This distinction is not merely a theoretical one.
Contracts signed in Quebec expressly prevent manufacturers from limiting their
liability for latent defects.97 Such clauses are permitted elsewhere in Canada.98 As
a result of this decision, choice of provincial law clauses are expected to become
93
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more common in contracts with a maritime nexus.99 It is also possible that
Parliament will take up the concurring opinion’s call and enact a federal Sale of
Goods Act that would apply to navigation and shipping.100
2.

Subsequent Judicial Treatment

There has been limited judicial treatment of the Desgagnés decision. It has only
been cited twice by the courts since the decision was released. One Quebec lower
court decision cited it as standing for the proposition that deference should be
required in cases raising constitutional questions.101 The second decision was in an
application for advice and directions for the Greenhouse Gas Reference at the
Alberta Court of Appeal.102
VI. COMMON THEMES ARISING
1.

FROM

ORPHAN WELLS AND DESGAGNÉS

Cooperative Federalism, Paramountcy and Interjurisdictional Immunity

Both decisions address the question of how apparent conﬂicts between federal
and provincial schemes should be managed in the private law context. This
discussion necessarily led the Supreme Court to review the principles of cooperative
federalism, or “ﬂexible federalism” as it was referred to in Desgagnés, in each case.
Cooperative or ﬂexible federalism recognizes that overlapping powers are unavoidable103 in the division of powers between federal and provincial governments. To
manage the tension inherent in overlapping jurisdictions, there must be a role for
each order of government.104 This concept is viewed as a guiding, legal principle105
that develops mechanisms to redistribute powers and resources.106
99
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The theme emerged in Saskatchewan’s factum in the Orphan Wells case as a
justiﬁcation for why the federal and provincial regimes should be seen as acting in
harmony.107 Cooperative federalism was also raised in the factums from Alberta,
British Columbia and Saskatchewan to argue that a conﬂict did not exist.108
Responding to this line of argument, the majority held that cooperative federalism
should be used to encourage courts to “avoid an expansive interpretation of the
purpose of federal legislation which will bring it into conﬂict with provincial
legislation”.109 This idea was central to the majority’s ﬁnding that a hypothetical
conﬂict between statutes was no conﬂict at all.110
However, the dissenting analysis in Orphan Wells held that the majority used
cooperative federalism to unduly narrow the scope of the federal law so as to not
ﬁnd a conﬂict.111 Cooperative federalism “supports, rather than supplants the
modern approach to statutory interpretation. . . . To rely on judicial restraint, then,
to avoid a conﬂict between a federal and provincial law is to disregard Parliament’s
express instruction”.112 In this particular case, the dissent argued that the majority’s
interpretation was inappropriate because of language in section 14.06(4) of the BIA
which appeared to anticipate and pre-empt a conﬂict. In short, the majority held that
cooperative federalism could be used to eliminate the potential of a conﬂict, whereas
the dissent held that such an interpretation would go too far.113
The interplay between cooperative federalism and paramountcy was referenced
by the majority in Orphan Wells. Picking up on Lemare Lake,114 the majority
indicated that any decision about whether to apply paramountcy “should also give
due weight to the principle of co-operative federalism”.115 The idea that it should be
a restraint on paramountcy was picked up elsewhere in the majority decision.116 It
was also raised in Desgagnés, where restraint was cited as necessary to avoid the
107
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erosion of provincial authority.117
In Desgagnés, the concept of ﬂexible federalism was raised by the intervener’s
factum as a reason to favour a constrained approach to interjurisdictional immunity.118 Per the doctrine of interjurisdictional immunity,
the core of exclusive heads of power under the Constitution Act, 1867, can be
protected from the effects of a law validly enacted by the other order of government
(Canadian Western Bank, at paras. 33-34; Rogers, at para. 59; COPA, at para. 26).
If the doctrine is found to apply, the impugned provisions remain valid but are
declared inapplicable to matters that would fall under the core of the exclusive head
of power of the other order of government.119

The cases cited for both interpretations are consistent.120 As with paramountcy,
described as the provincial law being declared inoperative in instances where valid
provincial and federal legislation conﬂict,121 both the majority in Orphan Wells and
the concurrence in Desgagnés cautioned against the use of interjurisdictional
immunity in the modern conception of federalism.122
2.

Deﬁning the Heads of Federal and Provincial Power

The proceedings in both cases also dealt with the question of what is at the core
of a constitutionally deﬁned head of power. While ultimately the Supreme Court did
not adjudicate on this question in Orphan Wells, it was raised by the Attorneys
General of Alberta, British Columbia and Saskatchewan in their factums. As an
alternative argument, Alberta said that its jurisdiction over natural resources had
responsible stewardship of those resources at its core.123 British Columbia’s factum
used slightly different language, ﬁnding that the “development, management and
conservation of non-renewable resources” were at the core of the provincial
jurisdiction.124 Neither factum used a legal framework to arrive at that conclusion,
117
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instead relying on inference and legislative history. British Columbia’s factum also
argued that reciprocal interjurisdictional immunity could be adopted in this case
because section 14.06 of the BIA is not at the core of the federal jurisdiction over
bankruptcy.125
What lies at the core of a federal power was discussed in much more detail in
Desgagnés. The majority applied an integral connection test informed by other case
law about the federal government’s authority over navigation and shipping.126 This
test is unique to the federal power over navigation and shipping. The majority
acknowledged that it is not as stringent as the test that applies to the trade and
commerce power, but held that this area was not at risk for federal overreach.127 The
concurrence differed with the majority on this point. It held that “applying different
tests for different heads of power is a recipe for confusion and inconsistency” that
lacked a logical basis.128 Its analysis largely sidestepped the issue of deﬁning the
core of the federal power by ﬁnding that the issue was pith and substance largely one
of property rights.129
3.

When Conﬂicts Cannot Arise

Both cases also provided examples of where a conﬂict or frustration of purpose
cannot arise for the purposes of paramountcy or interjurisdictional immunity. They
are:
•

when the conﬂict is between a statute and non-statutory rules;130 and

•

theoretical conﬂicts.131

Interestingly, factums in both cases raised the silence of the federal government in
the dispute.132 The factums argued that valid provincial laws should not be
invalidated where the federal government does not contest its validity. The federal
government did not contest the validity of the provincial laws in either case;
however, these cases raise the question of what weight its submissions would have
carried had the federal government commented.
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VII. CONCLUSION
Both decisions raise important questions for federalism in the context of private
law claims and disputes. The decision in Orphan Wells has provoked more
widespread reaction and further opportunities for judicial consideration. One major
challenge going forward will be the application of this decision in a subsequent
insolvency situation involving a Companies Creditors’ Arrangement Act133 proceeding, rather than a BIA proceeding. One commentator speculated that the result may
have been different if Redwater had been liquidated through a CCAA proceeding. If
the majority’s analysis holds and the Regulator is not a creditor, then it would not
be able to vote on a CCAA plan. Secured creditors could be enticed to support the
plan because they would be able to recover more than if they forced the company
into bankruptcy which would allow the Regulator to take a dominant claim.134 It
also remains unclear how the new apparent super priority for environmental
obligations will interact with statutory super priority claims, such as those for the
Crown.135
It will be important to empirically track if the decision in Orphan Wells has in fact
had an impact on the way secured lending is taking place and/or the types of
indemnities that insolvency professionals and trustees are insisting on in such ﬁles.
Similarly, it will be important to take note of whether there is a change in the nature
of contracts and choice of law clauses that parties are entering into in the maritime
context as a result of the Desgagnés decision. This empirical data will assist in
evaluating the add-on transactional costs imposed by the decisions and could help
guide future federalism decisions in the private law context.
Finally, with the Supreme Court’s recent decision on third party litigation funding
agreements136 in the insolvency context, it will be helpful to evaluate the role that
access to such funding will play in mitigating risks associated with lending and
recovering from a business with potential environmental liabilities. The extent to
which the mitigation of such risk is assisted by third party litigation funding may
provide more certainty for lenders in this context.
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